Verification

How to verify that the binary is correct, safe to use, and behaves as documented. Everything here is reproducible locally — the gated real-network suite is optional.

Offline gates (what CI runs)

These are the authoritative correctness gates; they are fast and need no network, secrets, or tokens:

cargo fmt --all -- --check                              # formatting
cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings # lint, warnings are errors
cargo test --all-targets --all-features --locked        # unit + integration
cargo build --release                                   # release build sanity

The integration suites (tests/*_server.rs) drive the compiled binary over stdio with the rmcp client and assert, per server:

• the full tool inventory and every parameter (plus tools/list cache hints ttlMs: 0 / cacheScope: public);
• access-control edge cases: .. traversal, symlink escapes, relative paths, non-existent targets, multiple roots, ~ expansion;
• robots.txt behaviors (missing/404, allow, disallow, 401/403, server errors), truncation pagination, user agents, and the fetch prompt;
• the memory JSONL lifecycle, persistence across restarts, the memory://knowledge-graph resource, and both subscription flows;
• shell argv/cwd/timeout/exit-code/truncation behavior and cwd validation.

Quick manual smoke tests

# CLI sanity: usage on stderr, exit code 1 (no server selected)
modelcontextprotocol

# Version and help
modelcontextprotocol --version
modelcontextprotocol --help

# Invalid combinations are rejected loudly
modelcontextprotocol filesystem /tmp --ignore-robots-txt   # exits 1
modelcontextprotocol fetch --memory-file /tmp/x.jsonl      # exits 1

To observe a live session, connect any MCP client that can run a stdio server. A minimal check with a generic client: start modelcontextprotocol memory --memory-file /tmp/smoke.jsonl, list tools (expect 9 memory tools), call create_entities with one entity, call read_graph, and confirm memory://knowledge-graph appears in resources/list.

Interactive inspection with the MCP Inspector

The MCP Inspector can drive the binary interactively. These commands are examples of how to wire it up; the Inspector itself is not part of this repository's test suite and no claim is made that it has been run against this binary:

npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli ./target/release/modelcontextprotocol \
  filesystem /path/to/dir --method tools/list

npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli ./target/release/modelcontextprotocol \
  fetch --method tools/call --tool-name fetch --tool-arg url=https://example.com

# Server flags go after the `--` separator (inspector CLI rule)
npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector --cli ./target/release/modelcontextprotocol \
  memory --memory-file /tmp/memory.jsonl -- --method tools/call \
  --tool-name create_entities --tool-arg 'entities=[{"name":"alice","entityType":"person","observations":[]}]'

Real-network acceptance (optional, gated)

The OpenRouter E2E suite (tests/openrouter_e2e.rs) is the strongest verification this repository offers: it runs every tool through a real model-mediated roundtrip and consumes the fetch prompt and memory resource through bounded real requests. It is #[ignore]d by default, requires OPENROUTER_API_KEY, and spends tokens — see OpenRouter E2E for the run command, bounds, and the most recent verified run.

What verification does not cover

• Compatibility with clients using the legacy initialize handshake is inherited from rmcp and is not locally acceptance-tested (see Protocol).
• Behavior of move_file when the destination already exists is platform-dependent (Unix rename may replace; Windows can fail) and is not asserted (see Filesystem server).
• No sandboxing guarantees: verification confirms the documented access controls, not isolation of the process user (see Security model).